[*05][Additionally, it defines us as human beings, and the conditions of our existence, for to be an "individual" implies an existence as a singular, distinct entity, derived etymologically from "one and indivisible" (in contemporary context these meanings can be synthesized into "indivisible separateness" [early 15c. "individual member of a species"]) - this is phenomenologically true regardless of what the actual matter of fact is ontologically.
The equivalentical relation between that of "person" and "indivisible" is shown to be a grave fallacy, as our operations might attest to that; here we understand the individual as being really a series of interconnected processes that, working together, give the appearance of being a single, separate whole. Here the idea of man that we're to take as our basis, our starting point in our anti-comallodianist investigations. (/Ontologically, however, we are to remain agnostic on the subject of what the *true* nature of man is, due to the task's immense, never-ending perplexity.) [*06][further distinction-making would leave us with the related categories of "psychologicals" and "actionals", but we will have to refrain from diving into these concepts for (the duration of) our present investigation]
[*07][muita funktioita: sadelta: inversion, transgression, subversion and transcendence] [*08][*09]poikkeava ajatus: se, että paasee syvemmalle johonkin ei valttamatta tarkoita sita, että siihen "pistaydytaan", vaan se voisi kaiketi tarkoittaa myös sita, että asia tehdaan ymmarrettavammaksi syventamalla eroja, eli esim. asettamalla vastakkaiset asiat vastakkain] [*10]When we're talking about phenomenologicals, we're describing the kind of semantic structures that imposes, or, to put it in a more psychological term, projects a meaningful, underlying sense upon the external world, which then either unites or connects all the single sense perceptions that we recreate in our minds, and places them within the boundaries of a category. To elaborate further on this, the former relation (that is, functionals > phenomenologicals) describes the kind of operations that we can execute and by which we can relate to the surrounding Home of ours in the most generalest of meanings of "relating to it" (interacting with it, affecting it, reshaping and molding it etc.), whereas the latter one deals with matters of fact larger than any singular operation that we could ever think of carrying out in our day-to-day lives - it has to do with the kinds of questions that give meaning to each and every functional that we perform by contextualizing, adjusting or conditioning them and or their meaning in accordance to whichever and whatever higher meaning or system of meaning(s) that happens to be ruling (either in the surrounding world or as our schemes of thought) at a given time. In order to illustrate this process more clearly, imagine perceiving the world "as it is". What would you see and how would your current understanding of the world change or differ if you were directly relating to the external world? Without concepts and language you would be incapable of grasping the totality of it all. [...] Now, imagine that someone placed "love" into the nexus of the world - that is to say, imagine that "love" was to become the unifying meaning of our world, that the arche, the constitutive, single substance of reality, were "love". How would the interrelationship between you and the world change then, and into what? In philosophy of science we would probably call this phenomenon the "theory-ladenness of perception", but under anti-comallodianism, this is transformed from an epistemological thesis into an existential-political tool: what if we were to saturate our perceptions intentionally with theory? In politics this same phenomenon can basically be seen as the underlying tensions between competing narratives and discourses - a verbal arms-wrestle that settles the question of who gets to frame the situation in the most favorable manner possible for their carefully managed public image [contra imago] to the detriment of their opponent. However, in contrast to its political counterpart, under anti-comallodianism, we're joining this arms-wrestle, not out of petty politicking or material gain, but out of a child-like want to intensify our conscious experiencing, out of a desire to expand our expression of life. What anti-comallodianism seeks to do with this - let us call it "perceptual reframing of phenomenologicals" - concept is to reshape our everyday life in a dramatic, transformative way through the redirection of vitae. How this happens, is as follows. Imagine you are placed inside a class room, full of people. What "constitutes" and defines the class room as class room is the ruling phenomenologicals, namely "school", "growing" and "working". No one clear phenomenological ever dominates a situation, but let us assume that it does. Now, because of these dominating phenomenologicals, the subservient functionals will derive their meanings from them. The functional "cultivation" refers to the phenomenological "school", so we are semantically deriving the meaning and sub-ideology: "cultivation in accordance to school['s ideals, materials and methods]". But what happens if someone - perhaps one of the students? - should one day jump onto his or her desk and proclaimed "this is all a game"? A kind of political conflict between the "school" and "game" phenomenologicals would ensure, and if the "game" phenomenological should happen to win this conflict, then the functional "cultivation" would take a drastic shift in its meaning. What kind of? Well, that's impossible to determine, as the concrete, prevailing conditions of its realization would, at the end of the day, determine its content, its essence and nature, not to mention to associated problem of defining what a game *is*, as the great LW once pointed out. A hypothetical speculation would suggest that it had something to do with an activity that somehow derives its meaning from itself (as that is what games are phenomenologically: activities that derive their sense from the activity itself. Maybe "cultivation", in this context, means that they are being trained to become better at the game, because of the game, for the game? |